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SHOULD NATIONS  LEARN TO  LIVE  WITH INFLATION? 
ABSTRACT 
It is often argued  that the most important tosts of inflation  can be 
substantially  mitigated  by indexing  reforms.  Yet governments  in moderate 
inflation  countries  have generally  been very reluctant  to  promote 
institutional  changes  that would  reduce  the costs of inflation.  Capital 
income  continues  to  be taxed on  a noainal basis,  indexed  bonds are  a  rarity, 
typical mortgage  contracts  keep  nominal  rather than real payments  constant, 
and interest  is  not paid  on  required  reserves. 
This paper  examines  the welfare  consequences  of inflation  mitigation 
measures  in  the context  of  dynamic  consistency  theories  of the determination 
of the  inflation rate.  Our  general  conclusion  is that recognizing  the 
effects  of inflation  mitigation  measures  on the choice  of the inflation  rate 
substantially  undercuts  the  welfare  case in their  favor.  It is easy to 
construct  examples  in  which  such measures  actually  reduce welfare.  The case 
for indexing  measures  is strongest  in  settings  where  governments  already 
have strong  anti—inflation  reputations,  cannot precisely  control  the 
inflation  rate, and  can offset  the effects of  unanticipated  inflation 
without  reducing  the costs of anticipated  inflation.  Conversely,  the  case 
for inflation  mitigation  measures  is  weakest  where governments  lack strong 
reputations,  can  control  the inflation  rate, and  where  indexing  makes it 
easier  to live  with anticipated  inflation. 
Stanley  Fischer  Lawrence  Summers 
The  World Bank  Department  of Economics 
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1818 H Street  Cambridge, MA  02118 
Washington,  DC  20431 Economists  regularly advocate a variety of  reforms including the 
indexation of tax brackets  and transfer payment programs,  the  measurement 
of capital  incoae  on an  inflation  adjusted  basis,  the issuance  of  government 
indexed  bonds,  the introduction  of  new  mortgage  instruments,  and  the  payment 
of interest  on money,  on  the  grounds  that these  policies  reduce  the costs of 
inflation.  Indeed  it is often  argued  that the most important  costs of 
inflation  are  "almost entirely  avoidable"  (Fischer. 1981)  ,  because of  the 
possibility  of enacting  these  inflation—cost  mitigating  reforms. 
Indexation  is of  course  widespread  in  high inflation economies.  But 
despite  their  experience  of  non—negligible  inflation, most industrialized 
economies  do  relatively  little  to  mitigate  its adverse effects.  Mortgages 
that keep real rather  than  nominal payments  level are nor observed,  nor is 
the payment  of interest  on required  reserves.  Capital  income continues  to 
he  measured  and taxed  on  a  nominal basis in  all major  countries.  Only 
social  aecurity  payments  are  effectively  indexed in most countries;  indexed 
government  bonds are  offered  only in Britain.  The  absence  of indexation  is 
not an accident.  Policies  directed  at  mitigating  the effects  of  inflation 
are often  seriously  put forward.  For example,  the original  Reagan 
Administration  proposal  for  tax reform called  for the use  of  indexing  in 
measuring  capital  income; and  a  transitional  advisory  team  for  the 
Administration  recommended  the issue of indexed bonds.  Both  proposals  were 
quickly  discarded. 
The  general  reluctance  of  governments  in  moderate  inflation  countries 
to promote  institutional  changes  that would  reduce  the costs of inflation 
calls  for explanation.  One set of  explanations,  favored by  economists, 
ascribes  the failure  to index  to the transitional  costs of  moving  to,  and 
the transactions  costs  of  operating  in, an indexed system.  Policymakers  by 
contrast  most  commonly  advance  some type of dynamic moral  hazard —2-- 
consideration  in dismissing  indexation.  They argue  that indexation  ends up 
counterproductive  as it  promotes  the  inflation whose  harmful  effects  it 
seeks  to mitigate. 
Formet U.S.  Federal  Resetve  Chairman Arthur  Burns  (1978,  p148)  advances 
both  arguments:  "This  [indexation]  is a counsel of  despair 
I doubt if 
there  is any  ptactical  way  of  redesigning  economic  contracts  to deal  with 
this  ptoblem  satisfactorily.  In  any  event,  if  a  nation  with  out ttaditions 
attempted  to  make it  easy to live with inflation, rather  than tesist  its 
cortosive  influence,  we  would  slowly but  steadily  lose  the sense of 
discipline  nmeded  to  pursue  governmental  policies  with  an  eye to  the 
permanent  welfare  of  our  people". 
Evaluating  the dynamic moral  hazard  argument,  or  more generally  the 
desirability  of inflation  mitigation  schemes,  requires  a theory  of  why 
governments  pursue  inflationary  policies  despite  their  apparent  costs,  and 
the  general  belief  that  petmanently  high  levels  of inflation  do not  yield 
benefits  in terms of  increased  output.  Recent work by  Kydland  and  Prescott 
(1971) and  Barro  and Gordon  (1983) has  provided  an interesting  theory  of 
inflation based on dynamic  consistency  tonsiderations.  Inflation  arises 
because  of  the government's 
incentive  to surprise  the private  sector  with 
unexpected  inflation  and reap  output benefits. 
This  paper  considers  the desirability  of  mitigating  the  costs of 
inflation  in the context  of these models  of  inflation  determination.  We 
reach  two primary  conclusions.  First,  recognizing  that  inflation  is a 
choice variable  which  will  be  affected  by changes  directed  at eliminating 
nominal  institutions,  substantially  undercuts  the case for inflation mitigation  measures  by governments  that have not established  a firm anti— 
inflationary  reputation.  It  is  easy to construct  examples  in which  the 
costs of the extra  inflation  that results from inflation  palliation  outweigh 
the direct  benefits  of the lower cost  oL a given  inflation  rate.  Second, 
that foregoing  indexation  is to  some extent  a  substitute  for developing  a 
reputation  for pursuing  anti—inflation  policies.  Nations  with  strong  anti— 
inflationary  reputations  can  more easily afford  indexation  policies  than 
other  nations  without  such  reputations. 
Section  I  lays out the basic  argument  in  the context  of the Barro— 
Cordon  (1983) model of inflation  determination.  Section  II  considers  how 
the government's  incomplete  control of the inflation rate and  alternative 
representations  of  the inflation  loss function  affect  the results.  Section 
III examines  issues  relating  to inflation mitigation  and reputation. 
Section  IV concludes  by  discussing  some  implications of  the results and 
directions  for  extension. 
I.  The Basic  Argument. 
We  follow  Barro and Cordon  (1983).  Suppose that there  is a short run 
Phillips  curve 
(1)  U_U*_a.(w_re) 
where U is the unemployment  rate, U* the natural  rate of unemployment,  x the 
inflation  rate, and m  the inflation  rate expected  at the  beginning  of the 
period. 
The government  is able  to determine  the actual  inflation  rate,  a, which 
it sets  to  minimize  the loss function —4— 
(2)  L  — (U  —  kU*)2 + hr2  ,  k C I 
This loss function  is assumed  to reflect  the preferences  of  both government 
and  society.  The parameter  b reflects  the costs of inflation,  while k 
determines  the strength  of the  government's  incentive  to create  unexpected 
inflation.  Such  an incentive  will  be present as long as kcl.  Note  also 
that (2) implies  that it is actual  as opposed  to unexpected  inflation  that 
has welfare  costs.  We commenton the  effects  of  distinguishing  between  the 
costs of actual  and  unexpected  inflation below. 
A  myopic  government  that ignores the effects of its choice of  inflation 
rate on  expected  inflation  smts the inflation  rate: 
(3)  x  — a[U*(l—k) + a  re]/(az  + b) 
implying  when expectations  are  fulfilled  with  iv  — 
(4)  iv  —  (a/b) U*(l—k) 
At the fulfilled  expectations  equilibrium,  the  value of the loss  function  is 
(5)  L' — [1 +  (a2/b)] 
Equations  (4) and (5) imply  that an increase  in a  both increases  the 
inflation  rate  and reduces  social welfare.  With higher  a, the Phillips 
curve  is less steep,  and the government  is more tempted  to try to create 
unanticipated  inflation,  which  now gives a  bigger  bang in terms of  lower 
unemployment  per point of inflation.  Accordingly,  inflation  has to rise to 
a  higher  level  before  the government  is no longer  tempted  to try and  create 
unexpected  inflation. A  more striking  result  is that  the  value of the loss function  (5) is 
decreasing  in  b.  Since the  parameter  b  measures  the social  cost of 
inflation,  this implies  that policy  measures  that reduce  the marainal  cost 
of inflation  end  uo  increasine  the  total cost of inflation  to society. 
Inflation  mitigation  policies,  although  they reduce  the costs associated 
with  a given  level of  inflation,  may  end  up  making  inflation  more costly  to 
society.  With the quadratic  coat function  considered  here,  inflation 
protection  is always  counterproductive,  because  the extra  inflation that 
results has costs that  exceed  the direct  benefits  of  protecting  against 
inflation. 
Interpreting  these  results  in  terms of  indexation,  wage indexation 
reduces  a (make  the Phillips  curve  steeper)  and thereby  increases  economic 
welfare.  Other  forms  of  indexation  such as tax and  social  security 
indexation  can  be interpreted  as reducing b, and thereby increasing  the 
social costs of  inflation.  Another  interpretation  is that b  can decline with 
result  of  the  removal  of controls  on interest  rates.  Portfolio—holders  move 
out of  money  into the now  higher—yielding  as.ets, b  declines,  the inflation 
tax  becomes  less  distortionary,  and  in  the new  equilibrium  the private 
sector becomes  worse  off. 
The example  in this section  suggests  that policymakers'  suspicions 
about mitigating  the costs of inflation may  welt  be  warranted.  At  any given 
level  of inflation  reducing  the marginal  cost  of inflation  improves  welfare. 
However  it may  make  things worse  once the induced effects  on  policy  and 
consequent  adjustment  of  expectations  is considered.  Avoiding  inflation 
mitigation  measures  is one way of  committing,  albeit  imperfectly,  to low future  inflation  rates.  In  the  example  here,  the reduced commitment  to low 
inflation  associated  with  inflation mitigation  exceeds  its direct  benefits. 
Indeed,  equation  (5) implies  that measures  which  artificially  increased  the 
costs of inflation  as reflected  in b would be desirable1.  The next section 
explores  the robustness  of  this conclusion. 
II. Extensions 
We consider  here two extensions  of the example  in the previous  section. 
First,  we examine  the implications  of government's  inability  to perfectly 
control  the inflation  rate.  Second, we  explore  alternatives  to the 
quadratic  inflation  loss function  that we have  maintained  so far.  Both 
extensions  demonstrate  the unsurprising  result  that under  circumstances, 
some forms of  inflation  mitigation  will  be desirable. 
Imperfect  Inflation  Control 
We have  so far  maintained  the  assumption  that the government  can 
precisely  determine  the  rate of  inflation;  experience  suggests  otherwise. 
Suppose  the  actual  rate of  inflation,  a  equals  (r*+c), where  is the 
intended  rate of inflation,  and c is a random  error  term, with  variance 
Then if  the  government  optimizes,  the expected  value of its loss function 
is: 
(6)  L' —  U*2(l_k)2  [l+(a2/b)] +  be2 
Rogoff's  argument  (1986) that the appointment  of conservative 
central  bankers  can improve economic  welfare  reflects  this fact. Now the  government  can  consider  setting the  optimal  level of inflation 
mitigation,  choosing  that level  of b  which  minimizes  L'  It is given  by: 
(7)  b*_  a[l/a2]1/2 
The optimum  level of inflation  mitigation  trades off the adverse 
effect  of mitigation  on the government's  intended level of inflation, 
against  the costs of  accidental  inflation.  As the variance  of  uncontrolled 
inflation  increases,  the optimal b decreases,  or  equivalently,  the  optimal 
degree  of inflation  cost  mitigation  (including  some forms of indexing) 
rises.  By contrast,  as k  decreases,  the  benefits  for the government  of 
trying  to create  unanticipated  inflation  increase,  and "dynamic 
inconsistency  inflation"  •  becomes more  important and the optimal  degree of 
inflation  mitigation  diminishes2 
Uncertain,  or  more accurately,  uncontrollable,  inflation  thus  provides 
one rationale  for inflation  protection.  Note though  that the  argument  of 
this section  implicitly  assumes  that the  uncontrollable  inflation  is caused 
by  a demand  shock  since  output  expands with  the  uncontrollable  inflation). 
Nowever,  some inflationary  episodes,  for instance those following  the oil 
price  shocks  in 1973 and 1980  are  e  result  of  unforeseen  supply  shocks.  It 
is well  known  that indexation  makes  dynamic  adjustment  to supply  shocks  more 
difficult.  This tends to  weaken  the argument  in favor of indexation as a 
means of  mitigating  the costs of uncontrollable  inflation. 
2  The intuition  behind  this result  should be clear.  In  a  world  where 
all accidents  were caused by  willful  speeding,  a policy of  installing 
daggers  in  steering  wheels  could  actually  promote  safety.  If some accidents 
occur  naturally,  this is a much  less attractive  strategy. —8— 
The loss function  L(  )  in  equation  (2) penalizes  only the  1 level 
of inflation.  Alternatively  the loss function  can penalize  both the actual 
level of inflation  and  unanticipated  inflation.  Losses  from unanticipated 
inflation  might  for example  include the social welfare  loss from the 
capricious  redistributions  associated  with  unexpected  inflation,  or the 
increases  in  uncertainty  created by large deviations  of  actual  from  expected 
inflation. 
In this case we can generalize  the loss function  to 
(8)  LL  '-  (U —  kU*)2  + b it2 +  c  (it —  me)2 
We  assume  as earlier  that the inflation  rate equals  (w*+c), where  w*  is the 
intended  inflation  rate.  It should be clear  chat the inclusion  of the extra 
term  has  no effect  on  the equilibrium  inflation  rare, x*  that the government 
aims for.  Nor  does ir have any  effect  on the calculation  of the optimal b 
in equation  (7), assuming  that b and  c are  independent. 
If  b  and c  can  be manipulated  separately,  then in the presence  of 
uncontrollable  inflation,  equation  (8) implies that social welfare  is 
improved by  reducing  c  as much as possible.  To the extent  that indexation 
measures  can  be found  that protect  only  against unanticipated  or 
uncontrolled  inflation,  without  affecting  the costs of anticipated 
inflation,  welfare  will be enhanced.  An  example  of  such a  measure  might  be 
the  indexarion  of  Social  Security  benefits.  On the other  hand,  policies 
affecting  b, the costs of actual  inflation  not unanticipated  inflation  might 
include the measurement  of capital income  on  a  real rather  than a  nominal 
basis,  the removal of controls  on  interest  rates, or the introduction  of 
tilted mortgages. —9-. 
Alternative  Loss Functions 
A first  generalization  of  the loss  function  employed  so far would 
involve allowing  for the possibility  that the optimal  inflation  tate is non- 
zero.  Rewriting  the inflation  cost function  in tetms of  the deviation  of 
inflation  from its optimal  level ,r_,r**, does not  altet  the conclusions  of 
our analysis  at all3. 
A  second  and  more significant  generalization  of  our analysis  would 
involve  relaxing  our assumption  that the  costs of inflation  are  quadratic  in 
the  inflation  tate.  While quadratic  costs can  be  justified  if inflation 
causes  Harberger  triangles, more  general  formulations  are plausible  as well. 
Suppose  that instead  of (2) there is an  additively  separable4  loss function, 
(15)  B — V(U — kU*) + bW(r) 
The marginal  costs of  both  unemployment  and inflation  are assumed  to  be 
positive  and increasing,  and  we assume  that  indexation  has no consequence 
when the inflation  rate is 0.  That is: 
V' > 0,  U' > 0,  V" >  0, U"  >  0,  W(0)—O 
The coefficient  b represents  the effects  of changes  in the extent  of 
inflation  mitigation  on  utility:  h falls as  mitigation  increases.  We 
In this case the equilibrium  inflation  rate rises  by  ir** relative to 
its  level in (4) and  the value of  the loss function  is exactly  the same  as 
in (5). 
Since we  will  be showing  that the effects of a change  in  b are 
ambiguous  even when the  utility  function  is separable,  there seem  to  be no 
further  insights  to be  gained  by  using  a  non—separable  function. —10— 
therefore  concentrate  on the effects of a  change  in b on the  infLation  rate 
and  on  welfare. 
The first order  condition  for the optimal  rate of inflation  is 
(16)  aV'(IJ*(l—k)) — bW'(r) 
An  increase  in  b thus results  in a lower  rate of inflation 
(17)  (dm/db) —  —  (W'/bW')  C 0 
The effecra  of a  change  in  b on  welfare may be calculated  from: 
(18)  (dH/db) —  14(m)  + b.W'(w)  (dw/db) 
—  14(w)  — (4'(w)2/tJ'l(w)) 
Whether  or  noc increases  fn  b reduce welfare  depends on  the 
relationship  between  total  and  marginal  utility,  since 
(19)  (dIi/db)  — 
The  effects  may be  of  either  sign.  In  the quadratic  loss  function  case 
examined  in  Section  I, dH/db  is negative,  so that an  increase  in the costs 
of inflation  or reduction  in  indexation  increases welfare.  That result 
holds  as long  as the  elasticity  of the  marginal  cost  of  inflation  with 
respect  to its level  is less than  the  elasticity  of the  total cost of 
inflation  with respect  to the  inflation rate,5 
8uc examples  can  be  constructed  where  inflation  mitigation  increases 
welfare.  Suppose 
14(p)  —  exp  (am) +  it  —  I,  a  > 0 
This example has positive  and  increasing  marginal  coats of  inflation,  and  in 
addition  14(0)  — 0.  But 
This  will  be  true  for  any coat  function  of the form  14—it't but not for 
all polynomial  functions  of  it,  as  we note  below. —11— 
(4111db)  — (sgn)  ((exp aa)(a2(w—l)  — 2a)  — 1) 
where  (sgn) means "of the same sign as". 
In this example  dll/db  is negative  for low rates of inflation  and 
positive  for  high rates of inflation.  Thus increased  indexation  would 
worsen  welfare  at low  rates of inflation  and  improve  it at high  rates of 
inflation.  The  former result  is a general proposition.  Given  the 
restrictions  on the 17(r)  function,  that it equal zero  at zero inflation  and 
have  a  positive  derivative,  it is impossible  to produce  a function  such that 
indexation  improves  welfare at rates of inflation close  to zero6 
The results  in this section suggest  that as a general  proposition  low 
inflation  countries  where the  government  can  closely  control  the inflation 
rate will find inflation  mitigation  counterproductive,  but that  the 
situation  is  more ambiguous  for  high inflation  countries.  This seems to 
conform  reasonably  well  with  observed  patterns  of  government  behavior. 
6  More  precisely,  the  restrictions  imposed  imply  that (dH/db)  is 
positive  at a zero inflation  rate; to see this,  examine equation  (11) and 
note that the first term  is  zero  for  p-O. while  the second  term is negative. 
But it  is  possible  to  produce  a  17(p)  function  such that  dH/db  starts out 
negative, becomes  positive,  and then  reverts  to being  negative.  One example 
is 
W(r) — ar + 
where a is small,  b is large, and  x  is large. —12— 
III. Commitment  and Inflation Mitigation  Policies 
In the model of  Section  I, foregoing  inflation coat  mitigation  ia 
deairable  becauae  it helps  to avoid  the dynamic consistency  problem  thst 
otherwise  gives rise  to inflation.  However,  alternative  less costly 
commitment  sttategies  may  be available  to the government.  Perhaps  the most 
extensively  analyzed  is efforts by  the monetaty  authority  to develop  a 
reputstion  for  being  inflation  averse.  Here we  examine  the desirability  of 
inflation  mitigation  arrangements  in models where the government  seeks  to 
develop  a  reputation  for  pursuing  low  inflation policies. 
Reputation 
Barro and  Gordon  (1983b) tteat  the case where  pnlicymakets  are  able to 
develop a  reputation  for inflation  aversion because  of  their  knowledge  that 
if  they "cheat" and inflate more than the public expects  they will  be 
punished by  an expectation  of  higher  inflation  in  subsequent  petiods.  Barro 
and  Gordon  explore  one of the many  possible  equilibria  in  which  the 
government  is punished  for  cheating  by an  increase  in  expected  inflation  for 
one period.  They make the assumption  that if  pnlicymakers  cheat  expected 
inflation  reverts  to the level  that would  be anticipated  if  policymakets  and 
the  public  were  playing  a  one  shot  game.  The equilibrium  inflation  rate is 
then  the lowest  rate at  which it  will not pay policymakers  to  deviate  and 
inflate more than the public  expects,  because of the subsequent  penalty  in 
tetms of  higher  expected  inflation. —13— 




We assume  that if the  government  fails to produce the  expected  inflation 
rate this period,  the private sector  expects the discretionary  inflation 
rate next  period.  If the government  produces  the  expected  inflation  rate 
this period,  it  is expected  to do so again next period.  As  before,  the 
discretionary  inflation  rate is given by: 
—  (a/b) U*(l_k) 
We  begin  by  considering  whether  a  zero inflation  rate can  be sustained 
as  an  equilibrium.  If the government has established  credibility  to the 
point  where a zero inflation  rate is anticipated,  it  can  gain, at least  in 
the short run  by  creating  unexpected  inflation,  and  reducing  unemployment. 
With  zero expected  inflation,  (3) implies that  government's  short run 
optimal  strategy  is to set: 
(21) ,r—aU*(l—k)/(a2+b) 
The temptation for  the  government to "cheat" and inflate is given by  the 
difference between  the loss associated  with (21)  and  the loss associated 





where  is the -loss when the  rate  of inflation  is expected  to be and is in 
fact equal to 0,  and Lc is the smaller  loss that  results when the government 
cheats. 
The  punishment  faced  by the government  if it cheats,  is the  increase  in 
inflation  expectations  to their one  period  discretionary  level.  Since the —14— 
punishment  occurs  one period  after  the gain from increasing  the  inflation 
tate,  it has to  be discounted.  Thus  the government's  gain from  cheating 
starting  in  a zero inflation  equilibrium  is: 
(23) Cain—Teaptation—Loss/(  l+d) 
—(a2/b)L[  (8—a2/b),/[  (1÷8)  (l+a2/b) 
The zero inflation  equilibrium  is sustainable  only if 8<a2/b,  a  condition 
that is mote  likely  to  be satisfied  if  inflation mitigation  provisions  are 
put in  place and  b is small. 
The explanation  for the  puzzling  result  that indexation  solidifies  a 
commitment  to zero  inflation  is that it is the feat of punishment  that  keeps 
the government  from  producing  unexpected  inflation.  Since  indexstion makes 
the discretionary  equilibrium  worse,  as we  saw in Section  1,  it raises  the 
punishment  for  deviating  from the zero inflation  equilibrium. 
Pethaps  the more realistic  case to consider  is  where  reputational 
considerations  enable  the  government  to have lower  inflation  rates  than 
would  otherwise  be sustainable,  but  where  they are not strong  enough  to 
permit  attainment  of  the first best.  In  this case  8>a2/b.  Let  Lt denote 
the loss when the government  is expected  to  and  does produce  a positive 
inflation  rate  wt that is less than 
lid.  The loss in this case is: 
(24)  L._[U*(l_k)]2  +  bOrr)2 
Consider  again  a  government  that is tempted  to cheat.  Its temptation  is 
given  by: 
(25)  TeaptationL  _([U*(l_k)_alVo_xre]2 
where  is the inflation  rate given  (3),  when expected  inflation  is  and 
the expression  in  brackets  is the loss when the government  acts 
opportunistically  given  a low  inflation  expectation. —15— 
If the government  cheats,  the loss that occurs  in the succeeding  period 
is: 
(26) Loss_bord2_5r2) 
The equilibrium  inflation  rate rr can  he solved  for  by equating  the 
temptation  to cheat  in (25) to the present value of the loss in (26): This 
is the lowest  inflation  rate at which  the government  is not tempted  to 
produce  surprise  inflation.  It is given by the solution  to: 
(27) r_A(l_k)U* 
b252[2+6+a2/b]  — 2ab(l+6)  —  o 
Real solutions  to this pair  of equations exist  only if  6a2/b<l,  that is if 
the government  is not too  impatient.  Otherwise  the government is unable to 
establish any sort of reputation, and goes  to the  one period discretionary 
solution.  In  the interesting  case,  where a  reputation  can be established, 
but  zero inflation  cannot  be attained, the  consistent  inflation  rate  is 
between  0  and 
Inspection  of (27) reveals  that b and  A enter  the same  way so that an 
increase  in  b is offset by  an equal  proportionate  change  in  A and  hence in 
the consistent  inflation  rate.  Equivalently  the elasticity  of A  with 
respect to  b is minus  one.  Thus an increase  in  inflation  mitigation  which 
reduces  b, increases  the equilibrium  inflation  rate.  Since  the welfare  loss 
from inflation  in  each  period  is given by  br2, it  follows  that increases  in 
b reduce  the total cost  of inflation, a  result paralleling  our  discussion  in 
Section  I. 
To summarize  our  results  on reputation,  the lower is  -b,  the  mote likely 
it is that the  government  can sustain a  zero inflation  rate.  But, if  we take the basic case to be  one where  the government  cannot  sustain  zero 
inflation,  then  allowing  for reputational  effects does not alter our  earlier 
conclusion,  that  with  perfectly  controllable  inflation  and a quadratic  loss 
function,  inflation mitiastion  promotes  inflation  and reduces welfare. 
Loosely  speaking  our results  imply  that a  government  with an  exemplary 
reputation  as an inflation  fighter  "tn  allow  indexing  without  fear  of 
adverse consequences,  and  may even  strengthen  its reputation  by so  doing. 
But any govornment withour  a sufficiently  strong  reputation  may worsen  welfare 
if it  odopts measures  to  mitigate  the costs of inflation. 
Signallina. 
Reputation  affects  of  a different kind may  also  work against  inflation 
mitigation  measures.  Introducing  inflation  mitigation  measures  may  affect 
the public's  perception  of  the monetary  authority's  perception  of inflation, 
If the  public  believes  the government has a  lower  b, it  may then  expect  a 
higher  inflation  rate, reducing  the benefits  to the government  of 
maintaining  a  zero inflation  equilibrium.  In  a  model in  which  the 
government  ham to  signal  its type to the private  sector,  for instance 
Persson  and  van  Wijnbergen  (1988), the introduction  of  indexation  may 
persusdethe private  sector  that  the government has decided  to move  to a 
higher  inflation  equilibrium. 
Perhaps  the most  plausible  way  of  thinking  about  this issue is to 
assume  that the public  is unsure  about whether  actual  policymakers  believe 
that  an  -increase in expected  inflation yields  benefits  in  the form  of —17— 
reduced unemployment  as argued  by  Tobin  (1972), or some fora  of desirable 
redistribution  as argued  by  Creider  (1987).  Policymakers  who believed  that 
inflation had desirable  side effects would  want to run higher  rates of 
inflation  than those who thought  it did not  have any benefits.  They would 
therefore  have a greater  incentive  to mitigate  the distortions  created by 
inflation.  Decisions  to adopt  inflation mitigation  strategies  might then  be 
interpreted  by the private  sector  as signalling  an intention on  the part of 
the government  to pursue  inflationist  policies. 
Political  Considerations 
In commenting  on  Barro and  Cordon  (198Th), John  Taylor  raises an 
important  question  about  dynamic  consistency  approaches  to the analysis  of 
inflation:  "In other  well recognized  time inconsistency  situations  society 
seems  to have found  ways  to institute  the optimal policy.  For example 
patent  laws are not repealed  each  year to prevent holders  of patents  from 
creating  monopolist  inefficiencies.  . .. It is difficult  to see  why the  zero 
inflation  policy  would  not be adopted in  much  a [Barro—Cordon]  world."  One 
explanation  for governmentm'  success  in solving  the patent  problem,  and its 
failure  in  other  areas  such am the frequent payment  of ransom  to  kidnappers, 
is their  tendency  to respond  to  concentrated  intense interests,  rather  than 
more diffuse  groups.  The small  group of  patent  holders  can  prevent 
expropriation  of  their  patents,  but the diffuse  group of  potential  future 
kidnap  victims  cannot prevent  the payment  of  ransom  on  behalf  of today's 
highly visible  victims. —18— 
This line of argument  suggests  that cettain  forms of inflation 
mitigation  such as  measures  that protect  Social Security  benefits  from  being 
eroded  by increased  inflation,  or that prevent  inflation  from  causing  sharp 
increases  in  business  tax burdens,  may significantly  inctease  equilibrium 
inflation  rates and  reduce  welfare by  eliminating  important  sources  of 
political  opposition  to inflation.  On the  other  hand,  measures  like the use 
of inflation  accounting or the  issuance of indexed bonds,  that do  not 
undercut  important  anti—inflation  lobbiea may  have less pronounced  inflation 
enhancing  effects.  - 
The  reputation,  signalling,  and  political  considerations  considered 
here all  suggest  that  inflation mitigation  policies  may well lead to 
increases  in  inflation  and  potentially  to reductions  in  welfare.  There  is 
however  an  important  contrast  between  theae results  and the ones in the 
preceding  section.  There  we argued in  the  context  of  one—shot  game  models 
that indexation  was least  likely to  be  attractive  at low rates of inflation. 
Our  analysis  here suggests  that successful  development  of  a reputation  can 
mubsritute  for foregoing  inflation mitigation.  To the extent  that aome 
nations  enjoy low  inflation,  because  their anti—inflation  reputations  are 
secure,  there  is an incentive  to  index, patticulatly  if the rate of 
inflation  cannot  be  accurately  controlled. 
IV.  Conclusions. 
Our main  conclusion  is that governments  whose  ability  to aaintain  low 
totes of inflation  is uncertain  may  end up by increasing  inflation  and —19— 
reducing  welfare  If they attempt  to reduce  the costs of  actual must  ion. 
Measures  which  reduce  the cost of anticipated  inflation, or undercut 
opposition  to it are particularly  likely  to be pernicious.  Governments 
with impeccable  anti—inflationary  credentials  have  little  reason  to 
fear iodexation,  snd some reason  to favor  it, particularly  if they cannot 
control  the  inflation  rate precisely.  Of course, at  very low  rates of 
inflation,  the transaction  costs  associated  with the introduction  and use of 
indexation  may  weight  against  doing  so. 
The analysis  raises  a  number  of  questions  that could  usefully  be 
explored  in further work.  First,  are  our  conclusions  empirically  valid? 
One implication  of the approach  would  seem to be  that the extent  of 
indexation  is U—shaped  in  relation  to  the inflation  rate: governments  with a 
reputation  allow  indexstion;  governments  without  a reputation  with high  b 
have  mediuai inflation;  and  governments  without  a  reputation  and low b  have 
high inflation  and  much indexation.  The  descending  portion  of the U 
probably  does not  exist in  practice,  but that may  be  because  of  the costs of 
indexation.  It is  certainly  true that indexation and inflation  mitigation 
measures  are  much  more common  in high than in  medium  inflation  countries. 
But it is difficult  to think  of a  model  in which  this would not  be true. 
If  a government  can  commit  to  not  mitigating  inflation, why can't  it 
commit  to  keeping  the inflation  rate low?  Probably  the  answer  lies in the 
different  structure  of  monetary  and inflation mitigation  policies.  A 
commitment  to not index  government debt is credible,  since if  nominal  bonds 
are issuS,  there would be  no incentive  to index them  ex—post.  Similarly,  tax 
rules  cannot be changed  ex—post  to reflect  distortions  in  measured  income 
caused  by inflation,  More  generally,  the fact that monetary  policies  are —20— 
subject  to continuous  alteration,  whereas  fiscal  institutions  can  only be 
adjusted  intermittently  allows  greater commitment  with respect to these 
institutions. 
What about  private sector  inflation mitigation  efforts?  To the extent 
that these  efforts are dependent  on  government  determined  regulatory  rules, 
the preceding  analysis  applies.  Recognizing  private sector  responses  to 
inflation  raises  an interesting  and perhaps empirically  relevant  possibility 
of  an  inflationary  shock  setting  off a  spiral.  If the private  sector  can 
adapt to inflation  it is plausible  that  the cost of any  given  inflation  rate 
depends  negatively  on the highest previous  inflation  rate.  (For example,  the 
introduction  of  money  market  funds  in the early  1970s in the US surely 
reduced  the costs of  the subsequent  inflation.)  A reduction  in the coat  of 
inflation  raises  the  equilibrium  rate  of inflation,  further reducing  the 
coat of subsequent  inflation,  and  so the inflation  rate may  ratchet 
upwards.7  Stopping  private  indexation  arrangements  may  be a  way of avoiding 
such a  spiral. 
Are the  principles  behind  this analysis  more general?  Our analysis 
brings  to mind  suggestions  like those of Friedman  and  bochanan,  that 
distortionary  taxes  are better  than non—disiortionary  ones  because  they will 
lead to  less government  spending  and Peltzman'a  (1976) discussion  of  how 
automobile  safety  regulation  can  have  perverse  effects.  The general 
In  an  earlier  version  of this paper  we  have  worked  out the  dynamics 
of  such a  process,  finding  that depending  on parameter values,  inflation  may 
either  reach a steady state  or else continue  rising without  bound.  In 
practice,  at some high inflation rate where  monetary  exchange  becomes 
extremely  costly, other  mechanisms  come  into action  to stabilize  the 
inflation  rare. —21— 
principle  seems  to be rhat in the presence  of distortions,  policies  that 
would  represent  Pareto  improvements  if behavior  were unchanged  by their 
implementation,  may  be undesirable  once their  incentive  effects are 
recognized.  Thus, a better  tax system may lead to  more  wasteful  spending, 
better  cars to  more speeding,  and  better  inflation  protection  to more 
inflation. —22— 
REFERENCES 
Barro,  R.J. and  0.8.  Cordon  (1983a) "A Positive  Theory  of Monetary  Policy  in 
a  Natural  Rate  Model",  Journal  of Political  Economy.  91  pp.589—610 
Barro,  R.J. and 0.8. Cordon  (1983b) "Rules, Discretion  and  Reputation  in  a 
Model of Monetary  Policy",  Journal  of  Monetary  Econoaics.  12 pp.  101—121 
Burns,  Arthur  F. (1978). Reflections  of  an Econoaic  Policy Maker. 
Washington,  DC: American  Enterprise  Institute. 
Fischer,  Stanley  (1981). "Toward  an  Understanding  of the Costs of Inflation: 
II", in  Karl Brunner  and  Allan  H. Meltzer  (eds), The Costs and  Consequences 
of  Inflation,  Carnegie—Rochester  Conference on  Series  on  Public  Policy.  Vol. 
15, North—Holland. 
Creider,  William  (1987). Secrets  of  The  Temple.  New York. Random  House 
Kydland,  F.E. and E.C. Prescott  (1977). "Rules, Rather  Than  Discretion:  The 
Inconsistency  of Optimal  Plans", Journal of  Political  Economy.  85  pp.  473— 
491 
Peltzman,  Sam (197S).  "The Effects  of  Automobile  Safety  Regulation",  Journal 
of Political  Economy.  83 pp.677—725 
Persaon,  Toraten  and Sweder van  Wijnbergen  (1988).  "Signalling,  Wage 
Controls  and  Monetary  Disinflation  Policy", Seminar  Paper  No.  406, Institute 
for  International  Economic  Studies,  Stockholm  University. 
Rogoff,  Kenneth  (1985). "The Optimal Degree of  Commitment  to an Intermediate 
Monetary  Target",  Ouarterly  Journal  of Economics,  100, 4 (Nov), 1169—1190. 
Taylor.  John  B.  (1983)  "Comments"  Journal of Monetary  Economics.  12  pp.123— 
125 
Tobin, James (1972) "Inflation  and  The  Phillips  Curve  Trade—off"  American 
Economic  Review. 